Towards disaster resilience: A scenario-based approach to co-producing and integrating hazard and risk knowledge, International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016Reduction, http://dx.doi.org/10. /j.ijdrr.2015 This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting galley proof before it is published in its final citable form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain. Quantitative risk assessment and risk management processes are critically examined in the context 8 of their applicability to the statistically infrequent and sometimes unforeseen events that trigger 9 major disasters. While of value when applied at regional or larger scales by governments and 10 insurance companies, these processes do not provide a rational basis for reducing the impacts of 11 major disasters at the local (community) level because in any given locality disaster events occur too 12 infrequently for their future occurrence in a realistic timeframe to be accurately predicted by 13 statistics. Given that regional and national strategies for disaster reduction cannot be effective 14 without effective local disaster reduction measures, this is a significant problem. Instead, we suggest 15 that communities, local government officials, civil society organisations and scientists could usefully 16 form teams to co-develop local hazard event and effects scenarios, around which the teams can 17 then develop realistic long-term plans for building local resilience. These plans may also be of value 18 in reducing the impacts of other disasters, and are likely to have the additional benefits of improving 19 science development, relevance and uptake, and of enhancing communication between scientists 20 and the public. 21
scenarios: co-production of knowledge. 23
Introduction 24
Current disaster reduction strategies are not working as well as anticipated (United Nations, 2011; 25
Wisner at al., 2012); the societal impact of major naturally-triggered disasters continues to increase 26 with time, although the number of fatalities appears to be falling (United Nations, 2009). The 27 increasing impacts of natural events in part reflect increasingly vulnerable and growing populations, 28 as well as the vulnerability of expanding infrastructure and investments, so that there is ever more 29 to lose in any given disaster. The increasing impact of natural events may also reflect changes in 30 earth system processes, due for example to climate change. Nevertheless, we suggest that more can 31 be done to reduce the impacts of disasters at the local (community) level, by taking a novel 32
approach to describing what we can know about future disasters. In particular, we suggest that 33 current disaster risk reduction (DRR) strategies are not fully effective in anticipating the impacts of 34 disasters, and thus in allowing those potentially affected to take action to reduce these impacts. 35
The present article is intended as a multi-disciplinary commentary, in the hope that it engages a 36 multi-disciplinary audience in the topics of local-level disaster reduction and resilience building. Our 37 aim is to facilitate productive dialogue; we present what we see as key principles in a form that is as 38 accessible as possible, to as many disciplines as possible, in order to encourage inter-disciplinary 39 debate. In taking this approach we acknowledge that many of the topics we touch on have deep 40 background literatures, and may in due course require much fuller treatment than we provide here. 41 We begin by outlining some of the problems, both theoretical and practical, with current disaster 42 reduction strategies. This leads to the suggestion that local event and effects scenarios, developed in 43 collaboration with communities, could support local-level planning, complementing the use of 44 conventional probabilistically-based risk analyses at regional and larger spatial scales by, for 45 example, governments and insurance companies. We also suggest that community/local 46 26 May 2015 government/civil society organisations/scientist teams can work to integrate community knowledge 47 with science and 'expert' knowledge (or what Lane et al. (2011) call non-certified and certified 48 expertise), so as to develop these disaster scenarios together. We argue that these co-produced 49 scenarios, if generated with an awareness of the relevant policy and governance contexts, can serve 50 as a useful consensual basis for developing more effective resilience strategies over time-scales of 51 societal interest. 52
Definitions 53
"Community" is used widely in disaster risk reduction circles as a focus for local-level planning and 54 bottom-up engagement but the concept is complex and contested. Cannon (2014) interrogates the 55 concept of community in the context of grassroots work and the role of community level work in 56 DRR, specifically arguing that there is no such thing as community; it is simply a convenient entry 57 point for research, policy and practice. Whilst acknowledging this critique and the internal divisions 58 and associated power dynamics that can exist, we use the term here to represent a varied group of 59 people, spatially situated, who are -to some extent -socially and economically interlinked; and 60 exposed to a disaster or disasters, both by virtue of their location in relation to particular hazards, 61 and also as a result of development and increasing social inequality. We are particularly interested in 62 communities from which a desire to increase their ability to plan for, cope with, and redevelop 63 following a major disaster has been expressed. We recognise that every community is linked to and 64 part of wider society, and that this two-way linkage helps shape community aspirations, behaviour 65 and wellbeing. 66 "Resilience" is notoriously difficult to define in an operational sense, even if intuitively less difficult 67 to conceptualise in general terms (Alexander, 2013 The essential purpose of DRR is to reduce the impacts of future disasters on society. The measures 77 needed to achieve this are, by implication, measures that increase the resilience of society to 78 disasters. In this commentary, we focus on rare and severe disaster events that are rapid in their 79 onset e.g. earthquakes, landslide and floods. However in doing so, we recognise that building 80 resilience to such events cannot be tackled in isolation from the more frequent "everyday" hazards 81 that impact people's lives and livelihoods. We also acknowledge that people may be constrained in 82 terms of the actions that they can and are willing to take due to poverty and poor health, among 83 other factors. Our focus here is on often known but rare events whose nature and time of 84 occurrence are unpredictable, as these tend to be overlooked by comparison with the more 85 frequent events that are more to the fore in public consciousness (and can, as we show, be used to 86 develop awareness of more damaging events). The rare events are however very catastrophic when 87 (inevitably) they do occur; our intent is to show that their effects can nevertheless be reduced, albeit 88 not by using conventional disaster risk reduction procedures alone. 89
On this basis, we now consider some of the impediments to improving the resilience of communities 90 and the societies of which they are a part. there are (at least) five fundamental problems that limit the effectiveness of this 132 approach for reducing disaster damage in a specified locality: 133 a. Probabilistically-based event predictions for a specific locality are intrinsically 134 unreliable even for known and well quantified disaster events because, by definition, 135 potentially disastrous events occur only a small number of times at a given location 136 in any realistic planning time-frame, and probabilistic predictions of small samples 137 have an intrinsically high degree of unreliability (Davies, 2015) . In other words, when 138 only a very small number of disaster events will occur in a realistic planning time-139 frame, it is extremely unlikely that their occurrence will match the probability of 140 their occurrence. A further difficulty -albeit one that is less fundamental and more 141 able to be remedied -is the fact that statistics for most disaster events are poorly-142 defined. Probabilistically-based risk analysis is essential and useful to the disaster 143 insurance industry, in part because this industry spreads risk over large spatial areas 144 and temporal periods, so that the number of disaster events considered is always 145 high. It is also useful for governments responsible for disaster reduction across largethan conventionally assumed. Despite this, probability-based risk analysis is often 148 the default mechanism for risk management, even at local scales (e.g., Papathhoma-149 c. The use of quantified risks to calculate cost-benefit ratios (or other utility 168 optimisation criteria) leads to extremely imprecise results. These procedures involve 169 calculating the differences between large and imprecise numbers (e.g. unmitigated 170
annual damage and mitigated annual damage), the result of which is, inevitably, a 171 much smaller and very much less precise number (in this case, gross benefit). Whenbenefit to yield net benefit, the imprecision increases even more (see text box). 174 d. Assigning an identified, large future event a very low probability usually means that it is 175 assumed to be of lesser priority than more frequent -and therefore more "urgent" -176 smaller (but still large) events. Thus, when the large event does (inevitably) occur, it is in 177 most cases unexpected because society -including local communities -has decided to 178 ignore it or delay its consideration; in this context its low probability effectively becomes 179 zero probability. 180
181

TEXT BOX:
Sensitivity of cost-benefit analysis to small errors: 182 Unmitigated average annual damage cost: $1,000,000 ± 10% = $900,000 -$1,100,000 183
Mitigated average annual damage cost: $600,000 ± 10% = $540,000 -$660,000 184
Gross average annual benefit: $560,000 -$240,000 ($400,000 ± $160,000 or $400,000 ± 40%) 185
Annual average mitigation cost: $300,000 ± 5% = $285,000 -$315,000 186
Net average annual benefit: $275,000 -$-75,000 ($100,000 ± $175,000 or $100,000 ± 175%) 187
Thus the net average annual return on investment, neglecting errors, of $100,000/$300,000 = 188 33%, is in fact anywhere between 92% and -25%. With increasing errors, the precision of the 189 net average annual benefit deteriorates rapidly. While utility optimisation is only one of a suite 190 of criteria relevant to disaster reduction decision-making, it often has considerable influence on Within local government and civil society, there is also a need to establish the approximate profile of 235 the kinds of groupings required to complete the group that successfully produces scenarios 236 together. 237
Scenarios 238
Rather than describing future disaster events primarily in terms of their magnitudes and 239 probabilities, we suggest that information about what can happen in the most important disaster-240 the next one -can be better developed by communities, practitioners and policy-makers by using 241 sets of scenarios. These scenarios describe the natural events that trigger disasters, together with 242 anticipated consequences for other natural systems (such as the triggering of landslides and 243 consequent river aggradation by earthquakes, e.g. Gill and Malamud, 2014) . Together, theycomprise the event or hazard scenarios. The scenario sets also describe the effects of these natural 245 events on societal systems (the effects or impact scenarios). In reality the variation in event 246
scenarios is much greater than the variation in effects scenarios: the latter are mostly injuries, 247 deaths and damage, loss of commerce, loss of communications, and isolation, whereas the former 248 encompass earthquake, landslide, flood, storm, snow, ice, tsunami, debris flow and other processes. 249
Thus we suggest that effects scenarios are more useful than event scenarios, both because they are 250 more easily foreseen, and because these are the scenarios to which a community needs to develop 251 and respond in order to become more resilient. Co-developed by local and outside experts, the 252 outcome is potentially better than any group could achieve on its own, or by means of consultation and integrated into resilience planning, but is also intrinsically produced, rather than being simply 272 disseminated, so as to become common to all involved. 273
While it is well recognised that such initiatives should be community-owned and led to be successful, 274 the role of government (local and national) and civil society organisations in these resilience teams is 275 essential to unlock the political and economic resources required for local level resilience building 276 (Maskrey 2011). As summarised by Maskrey (2011: 51) , in his review of community-based disaster 277 risk management, such government-civil society partnerships 'enable the investment of resources 278 that are unavailable locally and increase continuity and sustainability as initiatives move from stand-279 alone projects and programmes to longer-term processes' (Maskrey 2011: 51) . 280
The quality of communication within the diverse community-civil-society-scientist-local government 281 teams is crucial to the quality of the outputs. This requires acknowledgement and specific attention, 282 involving perhaps an experienced and independent facilitator. 283
Resilience planning 284
When a set of scenarios has been developed that the team agrees is a useful representation of what 285 can occur when the community experiences a disaster, the next stage is to develop ways of reducing 286 the impacts of the chosen scenarios on society, in particular in the context of how the community 287 foresees itself changing into the future. Indeed, thinking into the future is likely to highlight some 288 specific strategies for increasing resilience, for example, by reducing dependence on particular social 289 arrangements, processes or behaviours that contribute to present-day vulnerability to the given 290 scenarios. This may involve, for example, agricultural diversification; or, in extreme cases, gradual 291 relocation of assets. 292
In this strategy there is an implied assumption that increased resilience to the scenario effects will 293 result in increased resilience to the next major event to affect the community, whatever it is, and so 294 the choice of the set of scenarios is clearly important (Alexander, 2000) . By concentrating on the 295 effects scenarios, and developing resilience to them by addressing the causes of vulnerability, there 296 is also the possibility -albeit one that cannot be tested in advance -that societal resilience to events 297 that differ significantly from the event scenarios will also be increased. As noted above, a powerful 298 justification for community-chosen scenarios is that they are by definition highly relevant to the 299 community; this perspective may need to be emphasised to counter external challenges that the 300 chosen scenarios are less relevant than other scenarios. 301
It may also be possible to use some scenarios, based on less extreme events whose effects are 302 known locally, as 'gateways'. These scenarios can be used as ways of building resilience to the 303 effects of other events that the community has not yet experienced (Robledo et al., 2004) . For 304 example, a community with rich experience in dealing with the effects of frequent landslides may be 305 able to use that experience to design arrangements or processes that will help build resilience to the 306 effects of less frequent (but potentially much more damaging) earthquakes. Again, building 307 scenarios for the effects of one event may help to build resilience to the effects of other events. 308
Engagement and therefore empowerment with regard to the development of one scenario has the 309 potential, we argue, to ripple through to other scenarios and events; this potential, however, 310 remains to be tested, and is an avenue for future research. 311
As in all attempts to manage human-natural system interactions, the effects of the resilience 312 measures developed and implemented by the community-civil society-scientist-local government 313 teams need to be continually monitored, evaluated, reflected on and adapted as the community and 314 its natural environment evolve. The real effect of the resilience measures adopted will only become 315 clearly evident following a disaster event, but the effects of minor events may give some useful 316 indications of measures that could usefully be modified. This monitoring, evaluation and reflection 317 need to be carried out by the community-scientist-local government team, which means that this 318 team is not a one-off project collaboration but must continue to act as a resilience advisory team forthe community, as suggested by many community-based disaster risk reduction and management 320 initiatives over the past three decades (e.g. Maskrey, 1984; Delica-Willison and Gaillard, 2012) . Thus 321 while such community-science-local government partnerships clearly have the potential to offer 322 immediate benefits, it is also likely that these will increase over time. Ongoing joint engagement 323 offers the best chance of maximising such benefits, and of facilitating adaptation to medium-and 324 longer-term changes in natural and social systems. Involving communities in building scenarios for 325 resilience will help to ensure maintenance of local focus when national policy attention turns 326 elsewhere (Delica- Willison and Willison, 2004) . 327
Using the information derived from the documented co-production of scenarios and resilience-328 building initiatives, both natural and social scientists can develop increasingly-sound scientific bases 329 for understanding natural events and the vulnerability and resilience of society to disasters resulting 330 from them. 331
It is perhaps useful here to think about where the responsibility lies for planning community 332 resilience to future disasters. Any community is a deeply-linked component of local, regional and 333 national society, and while its well-being is of significance at all scales, its significance is nevertheless 334 highest locally. Thus direct responsibility for planning for future disasters lies primarily in and around 335 the community. In some cases, however, the regional and national linkages may be so important 336 that a disaster to the community severely affects regional and national economies, for example the 337 devastation of an iconic but small tourist town. Here responsibility is more widely distributed. In any 338 case, implementation of resilience strategies will often be beyond local resources, and higher-level 339 assistance will be needed. 340
Finally, we acknowledge that the strategy we suggest has a number of potential drawbacks that may 341 hinder its uptake. For example, the co-development of scenarios: 342  is likely to be time-consuming, a difficulty in an age of ever tighter deadlines and planning 343 horizons, together with fixed project durations; requires considerable flexibility on all sides, which in turn requires that established positions 346 need periodic reflection and re-examination; 347  requires a community to recognise the existence of specific and unknown hazards and 348 express a desire to address them which cannot be forced upon them; 349 
Summary
357
The imprecision intrinsic to probabilistically-based risk management means that it can be applied 358 reliably only to large numbers of potential disaster events. This means in turn that, while applicable 359 to disaster reduction across large areas (e.g., over nations or regions by governments, and over even 360 larger areas by insurance companies), probabilistically-based risk management cannot reliably be 361 used as the basis for community disaster reduction -which necessarily involves a limited spatial area 362 -over planning time scales relevant to society. This leaves a crucial gap in disaster reduction 363 methodologies locally, and therefore also at larger scales. Here we have suggested complementing 364 the probabilistic risk management process, which operates effectively on well-known and frequent 365 risks, with the development of disaster event and effects scenarios as a basis for local level resilience 366 building for poorly-known or unknown risks (in which risk management has intrinsic unreliability).government teams engaged in developing these scenarios, and the resulting plans for gradually 369 reducing vulnerability, have in addition the potential to (i) achieve greater integration between 370 community experience and formal science, (ii) produce increased understanding of the complex 371 behaviours of natural and social systems, and (iii) advance the natural and social sciences that 372 describe hazard events and their effects (Lane et al., 2011) in relevant and applicable directions. 373
This, we argue, is a key to making science more 'useful, usable and used' in DRR (Boaz and Hayden, 374 2002) while providing communities with a basis for developing increased resilience to the next major 375 disaster event. 376
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